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Key points
1. Emerging viruses remain a threat to health globally and they can not be readily 
eradicated as their natural reservoir is wild animals.
2. The threat posed mostly comes from known viruses that re-emerge intermittently 
or emerge in countries where the population has not been exposed before.  
However, viruses that have never been reported before can also appear.
3. Individuals should seek health advice before overseas travel.
4. Clinicians need to ask about travel history and know the local 
pathway/arrangements for managing imported fever.
5. Public health surveillance and response is interlinked with the clinical response.
6. Research and development is needed for vaccines, treatments and diagnostics 
to minimise the risk of infection and the size of outbreaks.
What is on the radar, why and what is the potential impact?
The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) in 2002-
2004, swine-origin, pandemic H1N1 influenza in 2009-2010 and Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) since 2012 highlights the threat emerging viruses 
pose globally.  None of the above were as severe as initially feared due to a 
combination of the viruses being less easily transmitted from person to person, causing 
less severe disease or being inhibited by existing, approved drugs.  However, there are 
a number of other threats against which we have no vaccines or antiviral drugs (World 
Health Organisation 2015; Table 1).  Within the UK, travel-associated cases of 
emerging viruses are regularly identified but only very rarely lead to further, locally 
transmitted cases (Figure 1).  The recent outbreak of Ebola virus in West Africa and the 
ongoing outbreak of Zika virus in the Americas have tested global and UK 
preparedness. The key question is what contingencies have been, or need to be, put in 
place to limit the potential harm these infections can cause?
Emerging viruses are going to be a continuing threat for a number of reasons.  A 
growing global population and urban spread means that more people are living in closer 
proximity to the natural reservoirs of these viruses and each other.  Greater mobility and 
connectivity allows these infections to spread more rapidly across the globe (Weiss & 
McMichael 2004).  As bat species are the reservoirs for a number of these viruses it 
would be very difficult, if not impossible, eradicate the viruses from these hosts and stop 
the initial spillover events (Amman et al. 2014).
The scale of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa has been widely cited as unprecedented.  
The number of cases exceeded 28 000 while the previous largest outbreak, in Uganda 
in 2000-2001, had just 425 cases (To et al. 2015).  These figures are unfortunately 
dwarfed by the estimated impact of emerging viruses over the last century - 1918 
pandemic influenza killed 50-100 million people (Johnson & Mueller 2002), and HIV has 
claimed over 35 million lives (World Health Organisation 2016).  The SARS-CoV 
outbreak cost an estimated USD$40bn.  Lastly, pandemics in the 21st century are 
predicted to wipe USD$6tn off the global economy (Anon 2016).
In the UK, the number of cases underestimates the impact of emerging viruses as 
extensive efforts and resources are expended to prevent spread.
Mitigating the threat
Strategies for reducing the risk of outbreaks of emerging viruses occurring and the size 
of any outbreaks are well known: surveillance, early diagnosis, infection 
control/isolation, clinical care, contact tracing and community mobilisation.
Surveillance
Within the UK, the multi-agency Human Animal Infections and Risk Surveillance 
(HAIRS) group undertakes horizon scanning (HAIRS 2013) to identify, discuss and risk 
assess infections with potential for interspecies transfer (i.e. zoonotic infections).  
HAIRS publishes a monthly report of infections thought to be of potential significance 
(Table 2) as well as disease specific risk assessments, most recently for Zika (HAIRS 
2016).
Pre-travel
NaTHNaC, the National Travel Health Network and Centre, provides travel health 
advice and guidance for healthcare professionals and travellers (Table 2).
Control
The high quality of UK infrastructure (water, sanitation, housing etc.), high standards of 
living, climate and universal infection control precautions within healthcare offers some 
protection against spread of infectious diseases in the UK.  This is highly effective for 
many imported infections (cholera, rabies virus, malaria etc.).  However specific 
diseases require additional control measures.
On return from overseas travel, an early specific response is dependent on early 
recognition and thus clinicians asking about travel history is key.  This was reinforced 
recently as part of both Ebola and Zika responses.
Once the risk of an imported infection is identified, the initial support for clinicians comes 
from local infection services (microbiology, virology or infectious disease teams).  Local 
health economies will have established systems for managing infectious diseases.  
Local infection consultants are supported by a wider national system.  The imported 
fever service (IFS) provides a clinical advisory and specialist diagnostic service for 
clinicians managing travellers who have returned to the UK and have presented with 
fever.  Hospital doctors can contact the IFS after discussion with their local infection 
consultant (Table 2).
Local Health Protection Teams (HPT) of Public Health England (PHE) and their 
equivalents in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland provide the initial public health risk 
assessment and response for any suspected cases.  For clinicians in England, the 
website to identify and contact the local HPT is in Table 2.
Following the Ebola outbreak in West Africa NHS England and PHE have established a 
High Consequence Infectious Diseases (HCID) programme.  This aims to “develop an 
agreed approach to managing the end-to-end patient pathway for known and unknown 
HCID (including suspected and confirmed cases)”.  This programme includes early isolation 
of suspect cases, safe systems of work and access to appropriate infectious diseases 
facilities.
Public health and scientific research
The public health and clinical responses should be implemented hand in hand with 
scientific research and development programmes.  These would include fundamental 
research to improve our understanding of these viruses, disease specific interventions 
and also technological platforms that could be used to target a variety of different 
viruses.  Ongoing endeavours include:
1. Ensuring a more integrated global framework of public health bodies to counter 
infectious diseases.  These would comprise strong national public health 
infrastructure that could be advised by effective global and regional bodies.  
Implementation of the International Health Regulations (Anon 2005), and the 
Global Health Security Agenda (Table 2) will both contribute to this.
2. A “global biosecurity outbreak vaccine fund” has been proposed to develop 
vaccines and treatments through to Phase II clinical trials (Prof. Hill, Oxford 
London Lecture 2016).  These could then be used initially to protect front line 
workers against the threat of emerging viruses as they bear the major burden 
from these diseases.
3. The WHO is currently shortlisting platform technologies for diagnostic, antiviral 
drug and vaccine development that can be established immediately and readily 
adapted in an outbreak situation (World Health Organisation 2015).
The combined cost for all of this?  An estimated USD$4.5bn a year (Anon 2016).  This 
sounds a lot, but needs to be balanced against the USD$40bn cost of SARS-CoV alone 
(Anon 2016).
Table 1:  (Re-)Emerging virus threats to human health.
Virus family
   Species
Disease caused Suggested 
treatment
Other information
Filoviridae
   Marburg Marburgvirus
   Zaire ebolavirus
Haemorrhagic fever. Supportive therapy.
Some drugs and 
vaccines in early 
clinical testing.
Viruses not reported 
in UK wildlife.
Coronaviridae
   MERS-CoV
   SARS-CoV
Significant 
respiratory disease.
Supportive therapy.
Evidence for use of 
repurposed drugs 
but no licensed 
vaccines.
Viruses not reported 
in UK wildlife.
Flaviviridae1
   Dengue virus
   Zika virus
Varied.  From 
asymptomatic to 
haemorrhagic fever.
Licensed vaccines 
(e.g. JEV) but no 
licensed drugs. 
Supportive therapy 
or drug repurposing.
Some mosquito 
vectors found in the 
UK but no local 
transmission of the 
virus.
Orthomyxoviridae
   Influenza A virus (HPAI)
Respiratory 
disease.
Licensed vaccines 
and drugs available.
Cases of HPAI have 
been reported in UK 
wildlife.
Togaviridae
   Chikungunya virus
Rash, fever 
polyarthritis, 
encephalitis.
Supportive therapy.
No licensed drugs 
or human2 vaccines.
Virus or animal 
reservoir not found in 
UK.
Paramyxoviridae
   Hendra virus
   Nipah virus
Respiratory and 
encephalitic 
disease.
Supportive therapy.
No licensed drugs 
or human2 vaccines.
Viruses not reported 
in UK wildlife.
Bunyaviridae
   CCHFV
   Hantaan virus
   Rift Valley fever virus
Fever, rash, 
encephalitis, 
haemorrhaging.
Supportive therapy.
Only a few licensed 
vaccines available 
(e.g. RVFV and 
HTNV) for use in 
Africa and Asia.
Hantavirus already 
found in UK rodents. 
Some transmission 
vectors also present.
Rhabdoviridae
   Non-rabies lyssaviruses 
(European bat lyssavirus 2)
Delirium, partial 
paralysis and 
encephalitis
Licensed vaccines 
and antiviral drugs 
for rabies virus that 
are partially 
effective against 
some non-rabies 
lyssaviruses in vitro.
The UK is considered 
rabies free.  However, 
it is important to note 
that EBLV-2 has been 
found in UK bats.
Arenaviridae
   Lassa fever virus
Febrile illness, 
haemorrhaging.
Supportive therapy.
Generic antivirals 
and convalescent 
plasma therapy. 
Preclinical vaccines 
in development.
Viruses not found in 
UK, but have been in 
other European 
countries. Some 
transmission vectors 
found in UK.
1
 Specifically tick- or mosquito-borne, emerging flaviviruses.
2
 Licensed animal vaccines available for some viruses.
MERS-CoV = Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome virus; SARS-CoV = severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus; JEV = Japanese encephalitis virus; HPAI = highly 
pathogenic avian influenza; CCHFV = Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus; HTNV 
= Hantaan virus; EBLV-2 = European bat lyssavirus 2
Table 2:  Links to infectious disease public health resources
PHE = Public Health England; HAIRS = Human Animal Infections and Risk Surveillance 
group
Resource Published by Web address
Emerging infections: 
monthly summaries
PHE / HAIRS https://www.gov.uk/government/publications
/emerging-infections-monthly-summaries
Travel health guidance for 
healthcare professionals 
advising travellers
National Travel 
Health Network 
and Centre
http://travelhealthpro.org.uk/
Contact details for the 
imported fever service.
PHE https://www.gov.uk/guidance/imported-
fever-service-ifs
Contact details of the local 
health protection team
PHE https://www.gov.uk/health-protection-team
Global Health Security 
Agenda
A partnership of 
~50 nations, 
organizations and 
stakeholders
https://ghsagenda.org/
Figure 1:  Details of (re-)emerging virus infection cases in the UK since 2000.
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